Abstract: The “migratory bird-style” mobility of non-local young teachers in rural schools has exacerbated the inefficient cycle of teacher allocation in rural education. Drawing on a game-theoretic analytical framework, this study constructs a tripartite game model involving local governments, rural schools, and teachers to examine the formation mechanism of the retention dilemma of non-local young teachers in rural schools. The findings reveal that, under conditions of bounded rationality and information asymmetry, the three parties are locked into a low-level Nash equilibrium: local governments, constrained by fiscal pressures and performance assessments, tend to shift responsibilities downward; rural schools, seeking to avoid the risk of talent loss, adopt a strategy of “cautious utilization”; and teachers, after perceiving insufficient professional support and low credibility of policy commitments, choose a “short-term disengagement” strategy oriented toward career mobility. To break this deadlock, it is necessary to move beyond traditional moral exhortation by constructing incentive-compatible development contracts, strengthening institutional trust and the enforceability of policy commitments, and fostering a supportive social integration ecosystem. These measures can guide the three parties from a non-cooperative equilibrium toward a cooperative win-win outcome, thereby providing endogenous momentum for the revitalization of rural education.